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Fiscal Constraints,  Empirical  evidence supports
the hypothesis  that when
Collection Costs,  tariffs  and export  taxes  are
and Trade Policies  important  sources  of revenue
for  developing  countries,  and
when those countries have
Keiko  Kubota  narrow tax bases  and high
tax rates, trade liberalization
will come about when the
governments diversify  their
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Summary findings
That free trade allows economies in an ideal world to  necessary. Tax reforms reduce reliance on the existing
achieve the greatest possible welfare is one of the few  tax base, often allowing the statutory tax rate to be
undisputed propositions in economics. In reality,  lowered. This is a form of trade liberalization when it
however, free trade is rare.  involves the trade sector.
Kubota argues that many developing countries  Kubota defines trade liberalization in a somewhat
intervene in trade at least partly to raise revenues and  unconventional way: only reductions in the rates at
that episodes of trade liberalization are often linked to  which the trade sector is taxed are considered trade
tax reform.  liberalization. Tariffication of quotas, normally
She proposes a formal model to explain why  considered a form of trade liberalization, is treated  as tax
developing countries rely disproportionately  on tariffs  reform (expanding the tax base).
for government revenues, when tax reforms are  Kubota tests this hypothesis empirically, first through
expected, and under what conditions trade liberalization  three historic case studies (Bolivia, Jamaica, and
will take place.  Morocco) and then through systematic econometric
The model uses the simple concept of the fixed costs  analysis. She constructs a set of panel data for 38
involved in tax collection. When fiscal needs are limited  developing countries for 1980-92, using the statutory
and the infrastructure to monitor, administer, and collect  tariff rates published by UNCTAD.
taxes is not well-developed, it is optimal for governments  She uses empirical tests to isolate the cause of trade
to rely on a handful of easy-to-collect taxes, which  liberalization. The results support her hypothesis: tariff
generally includes trade taxes.  rates are positively related to fiscal shocks and negatively
When fiscal needs expand, the excess burden on the  associated with episodes of tax reform.
tax base grows rapidly, and tax reform becomes
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Abstract
That  free trade  allows an  economy to achieve the  highest  possible welfare
in an  ideal  world is one of the  few undisputed  propositions  in the  economics
profession.  Yet,  in  reality,  there  is virtually  no  country  that  practices  free
trade.  There  are roughly  three  types  of (not mutually-exclusive)  reasons  that
explain  why  trade  barriers  are  so prevalent.  First,  there  are  theories  that
show restricting  trade  can be  an optimal  policy, such  as the  infant  industry
story, strategic  trade  policy, and  endogenous  growth  considerations.  Second,
many  have argued  that  interest  group politics  drive governments  to intervene
in trade.  Third,  there  is a revenue-raising  aspect  to tariffs  and  export  taxes.
Trade  liberalization  is expected  to be  observed  on different  occasions  de-
pending  on which  of these  is the  main  reason  for the  impediments  to  exist.
In  the  first  case,  the  underlying  fundamentals  must  change  in order  for the
optimal  policy  to  be no  longer  the  best.  When  interest  group  politics  drive
governments to elect trade  barriers,  it is often suggested  that  they  can only be
removed  in times of extraordinary  economic distress:  the  atmosphere  of crisis
enables governments  to package macroeconomic  reforms, which  are absolutely
crucial  for the  return  of stability,  with  trade  reforms, which are viewed desir-
able but  are incidental  to the immediate  crisis. If governments  are intervening
in trade  primarily  to collect revenues,  then  trade  liberalization  is expected  to
be linked to  tax  reforms.
This paper  argues the  revenue-raising  reason is important,  particularly  for
less developed  countries.  It proposes  a formal model  to explain  why less de-
veloped  countries  rely disproportionately  on tariffs for government  revenues,
when tax reforms should occur, and under what  conditions  trade liberalization
'Views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed  in
any manner to the World Bank or to its member governments. The author wishes to thank John
McLaren, Shubham Chaudhuri, Ronald Findlay, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Ann Harrison, Jose Antonio
Gonzalez, and participants of the International-Development seminar and the Macro-International
workshop at Columbia University for helpful comments.
1will take place.  It  does so by using a simple concept of fixed costs involved
in collecting taxes.  When the fiscal needs are small and the infrastructure
to monitor, administer, and collect taxes is not well-developed,  it is optimal
for governments to collect a handful of easy to collect taxes, which gener-
ally includes trade  taxes.  When the fiscal needs expand, the excess burden
on the existing tax base grows rapidly until tax reforms become necessary.
Such reforms reduce the reliance on the existing tax base, and often allows
the statutory  tax rate on the existing base to be lowered, and this is trade
liberalization when it involves the trade sector. It is important to stress that
the term trade liberalization is used in somewhat unconventional way in this
paper:  only reductions of the rates at which trade sector is taxed are called
trade liberalization; tariffication  of quota, which  is normally considered  a form
of trade liberalization, is treated as tax reform (base expansion).
This hypothesis is tested empirically, first by three case studies on Mo-
rocco, Jamaica, and Bolivia and then by a systematic econometric analysis.
A panel data set of 38 developing  countries for years 1980-1992  is constructed
from the statutory  tariff rates published by UNCTAD. The empirical tests
attempt  to isolate the cause of trade liberalization, and the results are sup-
portive of the hypothesis this paper proposes.
1  Introduction
That  free trade  allows  an economy to  achieve the  highest  possible welfare  in  an
ideal world is one of the  few undisputed  propositions  in the  economics profession.
Even  in  the  second best  world,  tariffs and  export  taxes  are  bad  policies because
they  distort  production  as well as consumption  decisions.  Yet, in reality,  there  is
virtually  no country  that  practises  free trade.  Several reasons have been suggested
for the  existence and  persistence  of trade  restrictions.  These reasons can be roughly
divided  into three  groups.  First,  there  are theories  that  show restricting  trade  can
be an optimal policy. These include the optimal tariff argument,  the infant industry
story,1 strategic  trade  policy, and endogenous growth considerations.  By definition,
trade  liberalization  is undesirable  under  these scenarios unless the  underlying  fun-
damentals  change. 2 The  second group belongs to  the  political  economy literature
which argues  that  governments  are driven to intervene  in trade  in order to protect
powerful interest  groups  (see, for example,  Hillman  1989).  The trade  barriers  in
this  category  cause inefficient allocation of resources unlike those in the first group.
Once in place,  the inefficiencies are difficult or impossible to remove except,  as the
'Krueger (1993)  explains  that the infant industry  argument  was  one of the main pillars  of the
"import-substitution"  strategy  adopted  by the governments  of many newly  independent  countries
in the 1950s  and early  1960s.  These  governments  perceived  international  exchange  to be beneficial
mainly  to the industrialized  countries,  and sought  to achieve  development  through protection  of
carefully  selected  domestic  industries,  encouraged  by the apparent  success  of the Soviet  Union.
2The fall of the import-substitution  strategy  from grace  is generally  understood  to be caused
by an ideological  shift rather than changes  in the underlying  economic  fundamentals.
2conventional  wisdom  of the  literature  has  it,  in  times  of extraordinary  economic
distress.  In discussing the  Latin  American experience  in the  1980s, Rodrik  (1996)
suggests that  it is plausible that  the atmosphere of crisis "enabled reformist govern-
ments to package fiscal reforms, which were absolutely crucial for the return  of price
stability  with trade  and industrial  policy reforms, which were viewed desirable in the
longer run but were incidental  to the immediate crisis."  Tornell (1995) uses a game
theoretic  approach  to  analyze  the  Mexican  case of trade  liberalization  and  shows
that  the  shifts in balance  of power between  interest  groups durinlg macroeconomic
crises tend  to allow the government to introduce efficiency-enhancing but politically
costly reforms.  It is true that  the macroeconomic stabilization  and trade  reforms are
often observed together  but there  is no inherent  reason why this  "bundling"  should
take place (as Rodrik points  out).  In fact, Yatawara  (1998) finds empirical evidence
that  macroeconomic crises precipitate  trade  tightening  and  not liberalization.
Rather  than  pursuing  the  political  economy angle,  I hope to  shed some useful
light by looking at  the trade  liberalization  episodes in the  context of public finance.
The third  reason for governments to impose trade  restrictions  is simply to raise rev-
enues.  This aspect  is well-known and  is documented,  for example, by Riezman  and
Slernrod (1987). Revenues from international  trade  taxes  are typically  not large for
developed countries  but  they  are  substantial  for  developing economies  (table  1).
Even  developed countries  such as the  United  States  depended  on  trade  taxes  be-
fore they  developed sophisticated  tax collecting systems  as Baack  and  Ray  (1983),
among  others,  observe.  More  generally,  governments  with  limited  administrative
capacity  tend  to  collect revenues from sectors that  are easy to tax.  For example,
Mtatifikolo  (1990) makes the following observation  about  Tanzania  between  1974-
84: "Taxes which do not require the creation  of costly and more elaborate  collection
mechanism,  such as sales taxes  and  Pay  As You Earn,  have been  intensively used,
while those where  the degree of evasion is high and costs  associated  with  identify-
ing and  assessing payers are high, tax  effort is seen to be minimal."  Administering
income  taxes  and  value-added-taxes  requires  more  advanced  techniques  than  col-
lecting import  tariffs which can be accomplished by merely posting  some personnel
at  major  harbors..3  This  stylized fact seems not to have been discussed extensively
in the  literature  although  there  are notable  exceptions.  Mourmouras  (1991) shows
that  optimal  tariffs and  inflation taxes  can be positive in a small open  overlapping
generations  economy when the  only other  revenue  raising tool for the  government
3Nimeiri (1974)  writes "[tihe case for indirect taxation, and especially that  on foreign trade in
the Sudan, rests primarily on administrative simplicity. Import duties are both  easy and  cheap
to collect since the tax can usually be collected more effectively  from importers at a few points of
entry.  Elaborate accounting is not necessary and evasion  is rather difficult." However, collecting
tariffs is by no means effortless or costless, particularly in landlocked countries.  In Bolivia, for
example, the National Chamber of Commerce  believes  smuggling  was so pervasive  that  uncollected
taxes cost the government  nearly US$450  m in 1997. The IMF is reported to propose an investment
of $10m-15m in overhauling the customs service and reducing tax evasion (Economist, April 11,
1998). In general, "developing  countries have relied mainly on foreign trade taxes because they
are easier to collect" (Tanzi 1981).
3is a tax  on bonds.  Heady  and  Mitra  (1987) argue that  tariffs can improve welfare
when  there  are  distributional  concerns  and  the  government  is not  free to  tax  all
goods at different rates.  Anderson  (1997) conducts a series of welfare analyses com-
paring  the  outcomes under  various assumptions  when trade  protection  is removed
partially  and  other  forms of distortionary  taxation  and  the  government  spending
adjust  endogenously.  Gardner  and  Kimbrough  (1992) explain  the evolution  of the
tax  system  in the  United  States  using  a  three-period  model  with  a  different  tax
regime for each period with  exogenous switching between the regimes. According to
their model, tariffs are a part  of the optimal tax policy in the first two periods in US
history.  Corruption  and  evasion also make tax collection difficult, and  enforcement
costs  provide a rationale  for using narrow-based  taxes even when  Ramsey taxation
is an option,  as McLaren  (1998) shows.
Table  1. Tax revenue by type  of tax  and  by country  group
(percent of total taxes)
per capita income  Income  Domestic taxes on  Foreign trade  Tax
(US$ 1981)  taxes  goods and services  revenue
General  Excises  Import  Export  as a % of
sales &  duties  duties  GDP
Range  VAT
Low Income  28.9  17.0  13.2  25.9  3.0  14.9
Low middle  income  24.1  21.3  13.4  15.5  0.2  19.9
High  middle income  24.2  23.6  10.0  16.1  0.2  22.3
OECD  32.2  19.0  10.4  0.5  ..  33.1
All countries  27.3  20.2  11.7  14.5  0.9  22.5
sonrce:  Government  Finance  Statistics  1997  (1995  for  Low  Income  Countries)
This paper  proposes an  endogenous evolution of the  tax regime as a way of ex-
plaining  the link between trade  liberalization  and  tax  reforms.  First,  it shows why
tariffs  can be a part  of the  optimal  tax policy for a government  with  a revenue re-
quirement  constraint  and a limited administrative  capacity.  That  is, as long as the
revenue requirements  are not  so large, the  government's  best  policy is to tax  a few
easy-to-tax  sectors in the economy, which generally include trade.  Second, the paper
discusses when the government  should diversify its revenue sources to include taxes
that  are more costly to coflect. The expansion of the tax base is desirable when there
is an increase in revenue requirements  because  tax rates  can not  be raised without
limit  and  the  efficiency cost  is likely to be convex. 4 Then,  the  paper  turns  to the
conditions  under  which  "trade  liberalization"  (defined in  this  paper  as a decrease
4Clarete  and Whalley  (1987)  found  that the costs of trade taxes  rose much  more  rapidly than
those of domestic  taxes as the rates were increased  (in the context of a CGE model  for the
Philippines).
4in tariff rates)  is expected when a  "tax  reform" (defined as an expansion  of the tax
base)  is introduced  as a  response  to a fiscal shock.  The government  decreases its
dependency  on the existing  base when it diversifies its revenue sources.  It  can even
lower the  rates  (which is  "trade liberalization'  when it involves the trade  sector)  if
the  amount  of tax  revenues to be raised through  the pre-reform  base have declined
despite  the  overall increase  in  the  revenue  requirements.  For  example,  Morocco
managed  to  "increase tax  revenues from 20.9% of GDP  in  1987 to  26.4% in  1993
without  increasing tax  rates.  Statutory  rates  for the  most important  taxes  [were]
actually  reduced,  in some cases dramatically.  Base broadening,  improved adminis-
tration,  and  certain  other  discretionary  measures  [made] such tax  rate  reductions
possible"  (Sewell and Thirsk  1998). Indeed, one of the goals of tax  reforms in many
countries  is to  lower the  existing  rates  to  improve equity  and  to  reduce  incentive
distortions  while increasing  revenues at  the  same  time.  The  essence of the  story
this  paper  proposes is the following: trade  taxes exist for collecting revenues, fiscal
shocks prompt  source-diversifying tax  reforms (base broadening),  and  trade  liber-
alization  episodes  (tariff rate  reduction)  occur in the  context of the new and  more
efficient tax  regimes.5
By claiming revenue  collection as the  main motive  of trade  restrictions,  I omit
quantitative  barriers  from my discussion.  This is not because  they  are less impor-
tant  or interesting.  There  is a large  literature  on the  political economy of quanti-
tative  restrictions.6 For the  government's  choice between  tariffs and  quotas,  Cass-
ing and Hillman  (1985) propose  a model of a government with  revenue needs  that
seeks to  maximize political  support.  When the  domestic  market  structure  is non-
competitive,  the two instruments  have different effects. In their  model, the optimal
instrument  for a government can be tariffs, quotas,  or both depending on the specifi-
cations.  Political considerations  obviously play a role in the making of trade  policies.
My hope is to  compliment,  not  replace, the  contribution  of the  political  economy
literature  with  my analysis.
The  plan  of the  paper  is as follows.  Section  2 presents  a  simple  model  that
describes  the  optimal  choice of tax  rates  and  base for a  benign  government  with
revenue requirements.  In section 3, I discuss three  country case studies to illustrate
the  model  I  propose.  In  section  4,  some empirical  evidence using  cross-country
time-series data  for 38 developing countries is presented.  Section 5 concludes.
2  The  Model
2.1  The  consumer
The  model  is adapted  from  Yitzhaki  (1979).  The  consumer  is  a  representative
agent  with  a  linearly  homogeneous Cobb-Douglas  utility  function  and  exogenous
5Taxing  more sectors  is efficiency enhancing  because  it reduces  the  excess burden  of taxation.
6See, for example,  Choi  (1996).
5income Y.  This is pre-tax  gross income which can also be considered  as the  factor
endowment.  Following the  optimal  taxation  literature,  I assume producer  prices to
be fixed.  There  are n +  1 goods in the economy7, where:
goods 1 to n:  consumed domestically  (including one imported  good)
good n + 1: produced  domestically and  exported  (not consumed  at home).
The indirect  utility  of the consumer is represented  by:
n
V* =  max V(Y, ql, q2, .,  q7,)  =  maxAY TT(qi ai)  (1)
where
qi is the  consumer price of i,  and qi =  (1 + ti)pi,
pi is the  producer price of i,
ti is the  excise tax  on i,
n
aj Z ai  1,
i=1
The  demand  curve for good i takes  the form:
Y
Xi =  ai(-)  (2)
2.2  The  Producer
The producers  of domestically consumed  goods are perfectly competitive  with con-
stant  marginal  cost pi (fixed).  The exporter  is owned by  foreigners (foreign direct
investment),  and it has increasing marginal cost and faces a flat demand  curve since
the economy is assumed to be small.  The export sector is not taxed  but  is required
to have an export license that  restricts the quantity.  The government sets the export
quantity  so that  foreign exchange earnings will equal the  payment  required  for the
imports.  Any resulting  pure  profits  accrue  to foreigners and  do not  affect the  do-
mestic income. These rather  ad hoc assumptions  are not necessary but I make them
in order to avoid cluttering  the model.  Endogenizing the export tax complicates the
algebra  without  changing the substance  of the results.
2.3  The  Government
The  government  has an exogenous revenue requirement  G which is spent  on items
that  do  not  enter  the  utility  function  of the  consumer  directly,  such  as national
defense.  Although  an exogenous  revenue constraint  is by  no means realistic,  it is
just  a way to avoid modeling  the expenditure  side of the  government  which is not
the  focus of this paper.  There  are always exogenous components to a government's
7Alternatively,  n + 1 goods  can  be thought  of as categories  of taxes,  such  as income  tax,  sales
tax,  excise  tax,  etc.
6revenue requirements  such as the foreign debt borrowed by the previous government,
or spending  that  is authorized  by another  branch  of the government.8 The tools of
collecting revenues are  assumed  to  be limited to  tariffs  and excise taxes  although
levying these taxes from all sectors will amount  to a general consumption  tax which
is also equivalent to a lump-sum tax  in the context of this model.  The main feature
of the  model is that  the  tax on good i is assumed to  have a fixed collection cost Ci
associated  with  it.  This  is an  attempt  to  model the  observation  that  some taxes
are  easier to  collect than  others.  If there  were no  such costs then  the  best  policy
for the  government  is to collect Ramsey taxes  from all goods in order to  eliminate
the  excess burden  of taxation  (see Sandmo  1976).  There  are  several reasons  why
some taxes  are harder  to  collect than  others.  The first that  comes to  mind  is the
structure  of the economy. For example, black and gray markets  are  obviously hard
to  tax.  Transactions  in food crop  markets  in rural  area  are almost  impossible to
monitor,  and  therefore  difficult to tax.  Another  reason  is political  considerations.
The otherwise ideal sector to tax may be off-lirnits to the tax agency if it is controlled
by a politically  powerful individual  or group.  The Russian  "oligarchs" are  a good
example.9 Finally,  but  not  least important,  is the  lack of administrative  capacity.
This factor often proves to be the bottleneck for tax reforms as documented  by Patel
(1997) among others.
The goods are indexed  in the ascending order of collection costs.  For the goods
that  are consumed  domestically,  this  is without  any  loss of generality.  To simplify
the  analysis, I have ruled out export taxes as discussed in the previous section.' 0 For
all  i  e  [1,  n],  let  collection costs  associated with  i be less than  the  total  consumer
spending,  Ci <  ciY.  Any sector  I for which Cl > oxY  is a sector that  is impossibly
expensive  to tax,  and hence, not a part  of potential  base.  The government chooses
the tax  rates ti and  the number  of goods taxed  (tax base) -y  to maximize the utility
of the  consumer  subject  to the  revenue constraint  (Y is normalized  to one so that
8 The Economist reports that the real problem causing Brazil's fiscal crisis is the rigid structure
of government spending mandated by the constitution. Brazil collects  some 30% of GDP in taxes
but  only two-thirds (18.4% of GDP)  accrues to the  federal government.  "And just  four budget
items make up  90% of this:  constitutionally mandated transfers to other branches and  tiers of
the government; civil-service  pay; pensions and other welfare spending; and interest payment on
federal debt"  (Economist, September 26, 1998).
9Former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Y. Nemtsov  charged that the Russia's wealthiest tycoons,
or "oligarchs," orchestrated the removal of Sergei  V. Kiriyenko, former Prime Minister, because he
had become increasingly aggressive in trying to extract tax  payment from their business empires
(Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1998).
'1lf I allow the export sector to be taxed, the export and import taxes must be chosen so that
the  trade  is balanced.  This will depend on the elasticities of domestic demand and  supply as
well as whether the  export good has a market power in the world.  The amount of revenues to
be raised from the goods that  are produced and consumed domestically  will change depending on
whether one or both of the trade sectors is (are) taxed.  All these are pertinent considerations to
governments in the real world but they do not add any insight to the simple story I tell.
7Ci and G are fractions of the total income):
tY  n
maxV(t(-y;G))  = maxATT[pi  (1+ti)]  a  Ti (P3 j)  (3)
s.t.
tjpjxj - C, - G = O  (4)
i=l  i=l
where I have used the fact that maximizing  with respect to q and t are equivalent
since the producer price is fixed. t is expressed as a function of -y and G because
once y is chosen for a given G, t is determined automatically to clear the budget
constraint. The budget is assumed to be always balanced. The upper bound of the
exogenous  G is:
n
G < Y - c,  (5)
In Yitzhaki (1979), the number of goods are assumed to be sufficiently  large to
allow  for a continuous  approximation. I keep the goods discrete in order to capture
the notion that there are a finite number of taxable sectors in an economy. Goods
in the economy are generally divided into finite categories for taxation purposes
although the varieties of goods can be very many.
For any given -y  and G, the optimal tax is ti = t for all i < -y.  That is, all goods
that  are taxed are taxed at a uniform rate (see Sandmo 1976). This is because the
goods that  are included in the tax base are taxed according to the Ramsey Rule,
and Cobb-Douglas  utility function implies a uniform Ramsey tax."  I can choose
the unit of goods so that Pi = p for all i since the producer prices are fixed. I make
a final simplifying  assumption that ai =  a = l/n  for all i.  The formal problem for
the govermnent  can be rewritten as:




-yai  t-E  Ci - G =  O  (7)
where I have substituted the expression for the demand curve (2) in the budget
constraint. Government's  policy choice {t, y} is feasible when t(-y;  G) > 0 exists for
"If the  elasticity  of  demand  differed  across  goods,  the  optimal  tax rates  will  equate  the propor-
tional  reductions  in quantities  demanded.  If all goods  are normal  and  the cross-price  elasticities
are  only  of  secondary  importance,  then  the average  tax  rate will  move  in the  same  direction  as  the
uniform  rate.  The collection  cost associated  with the good (along with the demand  elasticity)  will
affect whether  it will be  included  in the tax  base but  not  the  rate  at  which it will be  taxed.
8a given G.  For a fixed tax  base -y, it is clearly the  case that  the  tax  rate  t  must
increase with the  revenue requirement  G.
Proposition  1  The tax base - that maximizes  V  is nondecreasing in G.
Proof:  in appendix.
At  the  margin,  the  government  equates  the  welfare cost  of the  excess burden
with the administrative  cost of taxing  another  sector.  This result says that  at  a low
level of G (relative to Y), the  government will choose optimally to tax  a few sectors
beginning  with the  least expensive to tax.  It will add more sectors to the  tax  base
as G  increases.  It  will never  take  sectors  out of the  tax  base  unless G  decreases
(which does not happen  very often in the real world).
Proposition  2  The optimal tax rate decreases when the tax base expands  (in the
neighborhoods of the threshold levels oj G  such that V(t(y;  6))  V(t(Qy+-;  I)))
(as illustrated in figure  1).
Proof:  in appendix.
Proposition  (2) suggests that  when a fiscal shock forces the government to under-
take tax  reforns,  one could expect the existing tax rates to be reduced  as long as the
increase  in the revenue needs was not huge. A reduction  of the tax  rate  on imports
is trade  liberalization  as defined  in this  paper.  The  intuition  is straightforward.
When  a tax reform  broadens  the base, the share  of revenues raised by the  existing
base declines.  The rates  at  which the existing  base must be  taxed  will go down if
the  reduction  of the  fiscal burden  per  sector is absolute  despite an overall increase
in the  revenue requirements.  The relationship  between  the revenue requirement  G
and  the optimal  tax  base -y and rate  t is depicted in figure  1. A fiscal shock which
increases G  will force the government to increase the tax  rate, expand  the tax  base,
or both.  The response of the government is summarized  as follows:
1.  increase the tax  rate and  keep the tax  base intact  if the  shock is small enough
to keep the  revenue constraint  under the  threshold  value.
2.  expand the tax base and  lower the rate  if the fiscal burden  per sector declines.
3.  expand  the  tax  base  and  raise  the  tax  rate  if the  fiscal burden  per  sector
increases.
92.4  Discussion
The model predicts  that  a government with  relatively low revenue requirements  will
optimally  choose a  narrow tax  base.  In almost  all countries,  international  trade  is
one of the least expensive sectors to tax and  therefore is included in the existing  tax
base.  When  there  is a fiscal shock that  increases the  government's  revenue  needs,
a  natural  response  might  be  to  tinker  with  the  rates  of tariffs  and  other  existing
taxes.  If, however, the  shock is relatively  large, or if the existing  tax  rates  are at  or
close to  the  revenue  maximizing  point,  then  raising the  tax  rates  will not increase
the  revenues sufficiently. It  will be necessary  to reform the tax  system.  If there  is a
significant base broadening,  either  by including new sectors or removing exemptions
from the  existing  base, then  chances  are that  existing  tax  rates  can be reduced.  If
the  base expansion  is relatively  minor or the shock was extremely  big compared  to
the  pre-shock  revenue  requirements,  then  the  tax  rates  may  be raised at  the  same
time.  Trade  liberalization  is observed  in  the  second case  and  trade  tightening  is
observed  in the  other  two cases.  Obviously, trade  liberalization  is not  restricted  to
reducing  the  tariff  rates.  In  many  episodes,  removing the  quantity  restrictions  or
tariffication  of quotas  are  the  important  components  (these  will come  under  base
expansion  in this  model  as noted  before).  I do  not  claim that  changes in  revenue
constraints  are the sole reason for trade  liberalization  for all countries  at  all times.
Rather,  my hope is to propose  an alternative  explanation  for the instances  of trade
liberalization  for which  existing theories  cannot  fully account.
In the  next  section,  I discuss events in three  countries  to illustrate  the  point  the
model  makes,  as well as to motivate  the  cross-country  analysis that  follows.  Each
of these  countries  underwent  a  significant  tax  reform  in the  mid  80s.  The  pre-
reform  tax  system  was narrow-based,  had  high marginal  rates,  and  relied  heavily
on international  trade  sector  for revenues.  When these  countries  experienced  grave
fiscal shocks in the middle of 1980s, they  responded  by base-expanding  tax reforms.
Trade  liberalization  followed  the  base-expansion,  that  is, when  alternative  sources
of revenues were (forecasted  to be)  secured.
3  Case  studies
3.1  Morocco
Since independence,  the  government  of Morocco intervened  heavily in international
trade  in order to protect  the  local industry  and to collect tax revenues.  A series of
balance of payment  crises caused  the authorities  to embark  on structural  adjustment
measures  that  included  trade  reforms.  Although  trade  liberalization  (reduction  of
taxes  on imports  in this  paper)  efforts began  in tandem  with  other  reforms,  it was
not  until  the  comprehensive  tax  reform  delivered  alternative  revenue  sources  that
they  truly  took hold.
Until the  1970s, Morocco maintained  the tax  system inherited from France  when
10it  achieved independence  in 1956.  There were many trade  barriers  in place during
this period as the government followed the  "import-substitution  strategy."  It started
to  raise  tax  rates  rapidly  around  1970 in order to  meet increasing  revenue  needs.
Between  1970 and  1983, corporate  income tax  rates  were raised  from  43 to  56%,
the  average import  duty nearly doubled from 15 to 28%, and the sales tax on goods
rose from 15 to  19%.  Over the  same  period,  however, the  tax  base was narrowed
unintentionally  due  to various investment  incentives, exemptions,  and evasion.
Tax  structure  in  Morocco  (selected)  (percent  of total  tax  revenue)
Tax  1972  1980  1986  1992
Taxes on income and profits  20.7  24.0  25.8  30.0
agriculture  tax  1.6  0.3  0.0
wages and  salaries  4.6  9.3  12.3  15.0
business profits tax  13.6  12.3  10.5  14.0
other  0.7  2.1  3.2  1.0
Taxes on domestic  goods and services  38.2  29.3  28.2  34.0
sales tax  12.8  13.8  15.2  25.0
excise tax  22.2  13.1  11.1
business license tax  2.5  1.4  1.3  9.0
Tax on international  trade  32.3  40.7  40.6  21.0
customs duties  13.2  8.9  9.9
special tax  on imports  2.7  15.0  8.4
sales tax  on imports  16.4  12.5  17.3
petroleum  levy  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.0
Central  Government  tax  revenue (% of GDP)  15.9  22.1  18.8  26.3
negligible
source: Ministry of Finance data (reproduced from Sewell  and Thirsk 1998)
In  1975, there  was a sudden  increase in the  price of phosphate  rock, a  major
export  that  accounted  for  approximately  a  third  of export  revenues.  The  export
boom was short-lived  and  a fall in the phosphate  price caused a sharp  deterioration
of the  government's  fiscal position.  Expenditures  expanded  more rapidly  than  the
windfall justified in the first place and  did not stop growing when the boom ended.
In  1978,  a  balance  of payments  crisis  forced the  authorities  to  seek the  support
of the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  Despite  the stabilization  program,  the
foreign debt  continued  to  grow until  the  adverse shocks  to  terms  of trade  caused
a  second crisis in  1983.  By  1985 foreign debt  service absorbed  70% of Morocco's
foreign exchange earnings.  The short-term  coping strategy  of the government  was
to cut back expenditures,  raise rates  on existing taxes,  acquire more credit  from the
central  bank,  and  accumulate  arrears.  However, the  government  saw the  need  to
address  the revenue side in the longer-run and asked the IMF for technical  assistance
in reforming  the tax system.  The primary  goals of the comprehensive  tax  reform of
1986, as expressed  in the  1984 Framework Law, were to broaden  the tax  base and
11to  lower the  marginal  tax  rates.  A new VAT, a new tax  on personal  income, and  a
petroleum  levy were introduced,  and  tax  exemptions  were reduced.  Although  the
tax reforms were not an overnight success, the government remained  steadfast  in its
commitment.  Tax revenues rose eventually  from 18.8% of GDP  in 1986 to 26.3% in
1992 while rates  were reduced  at  the  same time.
The  authorities  embarked  on  trade  liberalization  around  the  same  time  as tax
reforms.  In  order  to  expand  the  tax  base  as well  as to  make  the  trade  regime
less distortionary,  many quantitative  restrictions  on imports  were removed or made
less stringent.  Rate  reduction  also began in  1984 when  the special  import  tax  was
lowered from  15% to  10% and  the  maximum  customs  duty  rate  was reduced  to
60%.  Further  rationalization  of the  tariff  structure  was scheduled,  but  when the
fiscal performance  of 1984 proved disappointing,  it was delayed and  its magnitude
was curtailed.  When  the special  import  tax was cut  to  5% in 1987, an equivalent
across-the-board  increase  in customs duties  was implemented.  In 1988, the  special
import  tax  and  the  customs  stamp  duty  were merged  into what  was called a fiscal
import  duty, set at  a  12.5% rate  (UNDP-World  Bank  1999). As the  benefits  of the
comprehensive  tax  reform  began  to show, the government  proceeded  to  reduce tax
rates  on international  trade.  By 1992, tax revenues from imports 12 constituted  only
21% of the total,  compared  to  over 40% in 1980.
Morocco's  experience  illustrates  that  even when  the  government  is committed
to liberalizing  trade  "tax  reform  [has] to precede tariff  reform  as part  of a rational
sequence of policy reforms  (Sewell and  Thirsk  1998)."
3.2  Jamaica
The Jamaican  government's  response to acute fiscal difficulty in the early  1980s was
to increase  the  rates  of import  duties  and  excise taxes.  Although  these  emergency
measures  were successful in raising  revenues, the government  perceived  that  a com-
prehensive tax  reform was necessary due to wide-spread feelings of unfairness  among
the  citizens  as well as the  pressure  applied  by the  country's  creditors.  Tax reforms
started  in  1986.  As a  part  of the  comprehensive  reform,  the  emergency  surcharge
on imports  was lifted gradually  beginning  in the second year of the  reform.
Jamaica  is a small  Caribbean  nation  which had  capita  income  of $950 in  1986
(1985 constant  US dollars).  The  economy  experienced  a  severe  and  protracted
recession between  1974 and 1980 during  which real GDP  contracted  over 18%. Even
when  the  economy turned  around  in the  1980s, its  recovery was slow and  fragile.
The  government  negotiated  three  separate  loan  arrangements  with  the  IMF,  the
World  Bank  and  the  United  States  government  between  1981-82 and  as a  result,
much  of its  economic  policies in the  80s were influenced  by  these  creditors.  The
12The  table  of  selected  tax  structure  in  Morocco,  which  is reproduced  here  from  Sewell  and
Thirsk  (1998),  lists  sales  tax  on imports  as  a  component  of  taxes  on  international  trade.  This
is not  a conventional  classification.  In  the  context  of this  model,  however,  it is  appropriate  to
include  all taxes  levied  from goods  produced  abroad  as taxes  on international  trade.
12IMF  conditionality  included  reducing the  budget  deficit to the  target  level of 10%
by  the  fiscal  year  1983.  The  World  Bank  trade  liberalization  and  deregulation
(of the  citrus, and  sugar  industries).  The United  States government  did not  attach
explicit  conditions  to its loans but influenced the policies subtly  by funding projects,
including  a comprehensive  tax  reform.
In the  early  1980s, government  revenue as a percentage  of GDP  was about  23%
which was higher than  those of most other  comparable  income countries  (see table
1.1).  Jamaica's  reliance  on import  duties was relatively  low due to its  membership
in the  Caribbean  Community  (CARICOM),  which  required  its  members  to  apply
the  CARICOM  Common  External  Tariff.  The pre-reform  tax  system  was charac--
terized  by a narrow base, extremely  high rates,  complexity, and both  horizontal  and
vertical  inequity.  These  shortcomings  led the  government  to  start  a  study  of how
to simplify the  tax  system  without  reducing revenues.  In 1983 while the study  was
underway, the fiscal stance of the government  deteriorated  sharply when the  reveune
from bauxite  industry  (the main  foreign exchange earner) fell and  the government's
foreign  exchange  reserves  were  drained  by  soaring  payments  for  its  oil  purchases
and  debt  repayment.  The  government's  immediate  response  was to  increase  the
excise taxes  on cigarettes  and  spirits  in 1984, and  to raise the  import  stamp  duties
dramatically  in the  following year:  from  6 to  16 % on  raw materials,  from  10 to
30  % on  capital  goods,  and  from  10 to  40  % on  consumer  goods  (Shoup  1991).
These measures  were successful in increasing revenues.  In particular,  revenues from
import  duties  nearly  tripled  in one year.  However, their  distortionary  effects were
perceived  to be considerable  since the hike was dramatic  and the rate  structure  was
so complex as to  make implementation  rather  arbitrary.
Tax reforms  designed to  address  some of these  problems  started  in  1986.  The
new tax  system  expanded  the  tax  base,  and  the  emergency surcharges  on  imports
were  removed gradually  starting  in 1987.  The tax  reform enabled  the  govermnent
to  collect  adequate  revenues  from  an  increased  number  of sources  which  in  turn
allowed it to  "liberalize trade"  (decrease tariff  rates)  in order to  reduce the  excess
burden  imposed on the economy.
3.3  Bolivia
Bolivia  began  to  liberalize  its  trade  regime in  1985.  The reduction  of tariff  rates,
which  is what  I define as trade  liberalization  in this  paper,  however, did not  start
until  later  in  1986. Bolivia's  pre-reform  tax  system,  like Morocco's  and  Jamaica's,
had  a narrow base and  high rates,  and  raised two-thirds  of the  revenues from trade
taxes.  The country  experienced  a grave fiscal shock in the mid-80s, which prompted
the  government  to  undertake  a comprehensive  tax  reform,  and  the  resulting  base-
expansion  allowed it to lower the tax  rates  (tariffs) on the trade  sector.
In 1986, Bolivia was small, open, and  one of the poorest countries in the Western
Hemisphere with per  capita income o f US$600 (1985 constant  dollars).  The country
has  had  a volatile  history  caused  by  an intense  political,  ethnic  and  regional  divi-
13sion.  This diversity is likely to have been responsible at  least partially  for Bolivia's
fragmented  and ineffective tax system prior to the  reform." 3 The Bolivian economy
has always been highly dependent  on exporting natural  resources such as silver, tin,
and  oil.  Before  the  reform,  two thirds  of government  revenues  came from  trade
taxes  (see table  below),  which was unusually  high  even for a  developing  country.
The export duties  come almost exclusively from the state  enterprises,  and  are thus
classified under  direct  taxes  in  the  Bolivian  tax  code.  In  1975, for example,  two
state-owned  exporting  companies  Comibol  (tin)  and  YPFB  (petroleurm) made  up
44% of the central  government revenue.
selected  tax  structure  before  and  after  the  reform  (%of revenue)
source of revenue  1975  1987  1989
direct  taxes  52.3  55.8  61.5
domestic  direct  taxes  (excluding exports)  18.1  10.4  11.6
enterprise  tax  (private companies)  6.9  n.a.  n.a.
personal  income taxes  4.6  n.a.  n.a.
public enterprises  (closely related  to  export taxes)  34.2  46.1  49.9
export taxes  (33.4)  (45.1)  (42.5)
indirect  taxes  47.7  44.2  48.1
domestic indirect  taxes  (excluding imports)  18.1  26.7  33.2
excise taxes  (alcohol and  tobacco)  4.3  1.6  3.9
value added  tax  3.2  13.5  23.4
import  taxes  29.6  17.5  11.0
source: Thirsk (1998)
The rising revenues enjoyed by the government in the early 1970s due to high oil
prices and  increased oil production  led the  government to expand  spending  at  least
as rapidly.  When the revenue growth tapered off in the second half of the decade, the
government  chose to finance the  growing deficit with foreign loans,  rather  than  to
curtail  expenditures.  The global recession in the early  1980s caused  a deterioration
in terms  of trade  and a decline in export revenues, placing the Bolivian government
in extreme  fiscal difficulty.' 4 The government  resorted  to seigniorage when  foreign
lending stopped  and inflation spiraled out of control.  Hyperinflation  eroded  the real
value of tax  revenues because  of the  government's  inability  to adjust  the exchange
rate to keep up  with inflation,  lags in the collection process, and  also because taxes
were specific rather  than  ad valorem.
13Cukierman et al. (1992) suggest a political model of tax reform where countries with a more
unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient  tax structures.
14The collapse  of the tin price, in particular, hurt the Bolivian government's revenues. Bolivia's
fiscal shock took not the  form of an exogenous increase in the  revenue needs but an  exogenous
decrease in the tax receipts. However, the effects  of the shock on the other sectors in the tax  base
was similar to an exogenous  increase in the revenue  needs since the "residual" revenue  requirements
(net of the tin sector) had indeed increased.
14The  new government  of Paz  Estessoro,  elected in 1985, introduced  a bold  eco-
nomic reform package called the New Economic Policy which included an extensive
tax  reform to be enacted  in May 1986. The sweeping tax  reforms were designed to
increase  revenues, improve  efficiency of collection, and  simplify the  overall system.
The  old taxes  that  were  plagued  with  ad hoc  exemptions  and  loopholes were re-
placed by a set of new taxes  that  allowed few exceptions to the  rules. A new Office
of Tax Collections was established  as an independent  fiscal entity.  A creative  proce-
dure to file tax  returns  was introduced  to improve compliance. While  the domestic
component  of the tax system was overhauled with an aim of increasing revenues, the
international  component  was reformed to  reduce distortions.  The  tariff  rates  were
unified  and  reduced  to  20% in  August  1986, three  months  after  the  tax  reforms
went into effect.1 5 A uniform tariff was aimed  at  removing the  disparity  of protec-
tion  across sectors  and  at  decreasing  the  scope for corruption  at  the  border.  The
reduced  rate was hoped to discourage smuggling. The government's  dependency  on
import  duties  declined dramatically  as the tariff  rates  were lowered.
3.4  Discussion
The experiences  of Morocco, Jamaica  and Bolivia illustrate  the  sequence of events
that  countries  go through  as the  governments'  revenue  requirements  expand.  In
all  three  cases,  the  prevailing  tax  systems  had  narrow  bases.  When  there  were
increases in revenue needs, the governments responded first by raising the tax  rates,
even though  they  were generally aware of the efficiency costs of a tax system  with
a narrow  base and  high  rates.  Then  fiscal shocks dealt  final blows to the  existing
systems and the governments were forced to introduce tax reforms.  Once the reforms
took place,  "trade  liberalization  " followed, sometimes immediately,  sometimes with
a lag.  It  is telling that  trade  reforms happened  after  the  tax  reforms in all  three
cases studied  here.  If the  governments were "bundling,"  trade  liberalization  should
precede other  macroeconomic reforms since the  government would have to take  the
indisputably  desirable  macroeconomic  reforms hostage  in  order  to  introduce  the
"unpopular"  trade  liberalization.  I  am arguing,  however, that  both  tax  and  trade
reforms are components  of one fiscal reform.  They  are generally  not simultaneous
in the  real world with various frictions  because alternative  sources of revenues have
to  be secured  before the  government  can weather  the  reduction  in tariff  revenues.
These case studies provide motivation for the broader empirical work in the following
section.
15Prior  to August  1986,  quantitative  restrictions  on trade were  converted  into tariffs. These  are
trade-liberalization  in the normal  usage  of the term, but in the terminology  of this paper, are an
expansion of tax bases (tax reform).
154  Empirical  Analysis
4.1  The  Data
In this section, I take the first step in  quantifying the relationship between fis-
cal shock induced tax reforms and trade liberalization. I use the statutory  tariff
rate data from Directory of import regimes (1994) published by UNCTAD. To my
knowledge,  nobody has used the time-series dimension of this panel data  set be-
fore. Pritchett and Sethi (1994)  find that statutory tariff rates do not always reflect
actual rates, but  as long as they move in the same direction this problem should
not nullify my analyses. The tariff rates are sampled  four times around 1982, 1985,
1988 and 1992  at the beginning of the fiscal year, which varies across countries (see
appendix). This causes obvious  timing problems  which  I address the best I can. The
government revenue requirement  variable and other control variables are taken from
the Penn World Table, World Development Indicator (World Bank), the Govern-
ment Finance Statistics (IMF), and the International Financial Statistics Yearbook
(IMF). I do not have the data for the actual episodes of tax reforms and I attempt
to proxy them by a combination  of the existence  of an IMF program, large increases
in the share of general turnover taxes (or value added taxes) in governments' total
tax revenues,  and dramatic rises in the tax revenue  to GDP ratio. The rationale for
doing this are the following:  an overhaul of the tax system tends to be a condition
for IMF loans; a typical tax reform often involves  a movement  away  from excise and
international trade taxes to generalized indirect taxes; one of the goals for the tax
reform is usually to increase the tax revenue. 16 The particular set of criteria and
cutoff levels I used for the reported results are the following:
ReformDummy  = 1 if
IMF program existed concurrently  or in the previous year,
%change  in revenue share of VAT  to total taxes>.12,
or %change  in tax revenues  to GDP ratio>.06.
Seventy-five  percent of the observations had a below 12% and 6% changes in
the VAT share and the tax-to-GDP ratio respectively. These cutoff values (and to
a lesser extent the criteria also) are inevitably arbitrary but the results are robust
to  minor alterations." 7 The reform dummy constructed using these criteria and
cutoffs takes the value 1 about half the time, which may seem a little too frequent.
However,  considering  that the data are for the crisis-plagued  1980s,  this may in fact
be an accurate representation. Other data sources are Datastream (LIBOR) and
l'This  was not the case for the  1986  tax reform in Jamaica, where one of the goals was revenue
neutrality. I believe this is an exception rather than  a rule.
17I used percentage point changes of the tax share variables, and concurrent as well as lagged
existence of the IMF programs. I tried omitting one of the three criteria in turn  to construct the
dummy, which reduced the number of observations. I also altered the cutoff levels (the reported
result used the 75 percentile as the cutoff). None of these changed the substance of the results.
16the  Barro-Lee  data  set  (for education  variables).  Sources and  definitions  as well
as the  summary  statistics  of the variables  are listed  in the  appendix.  All variables
except  tariff  rates  are sampled  annually.  The  exchange rate  (level) is the  calendar
year average of the  market  rate  (whenever available), and all other  variables  (except
the  tariff  rates)  are sampled  at  the  end of the calendar  year.  The simple average of
the  mean  tariff  rates  is only slightly  higher for  manufactured  than  primary  goods
although  rates  vary greatly  across countries  and  items.  The overall average  of the
tariff  rate  changes  is negative,  implying  that  the trend  in the  1980s to  early  1990s
was trade  liberalization.  The countries  sampled had  IMF programs  about  a fifth of
the time.
According  to the  model,  a  rise  in tariff  rates  leads  to  an increase  in revenues.
In the  real world,  the  relationship  between  the  two is not so straightforward  since
there  are many things  other  than  tariffs  and  export  taxes  that  influence  the  trade
tax  revenues.  For example,  the  price of copper can soar independently  of the supply
condition,  allowing the  government  of copper-exporting  economy  to  collect  more
export  tax  revenues even as it reduces the  tax rate.  In this  case, the  correlation  of
the  rates  and  revenues is negative.  One piece of evidence supporting  the  model's
underlying  assumption  is that  the  IMF  economists  often  advise  the  governments
suffering from balance  of payments  crises to raise tariff  and  other tax  rates."8 Since
they  have  first-hand  experience  in  analyzing  the  economies they  advise,  it  seems
reasonable  to  trust  their  expertise.  Both  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank appear  to
believe that  a small increase  in the  tariff rate  will lead to more revenues, judged  by
their  publications.19 Taking  this  evidence,  albeit  anecdotal,  to  mean  that  govern-
ments  do perceive  raising  tariff  rates  as  a way to increase  revenues,  I move on  to
analyze the  relationship  between fiscal shocks, tax  reforms and tariff  rates.
4.2  Estimation  Results
In order  to  make  the  estimation  manageable,  I make  an  assumption  that  there  is
only one  "threshold  level of revenue  requirement  (G)"  that  forces governments  to
expand  their  tax  bases  when  they  cross it.  This  is not  a bad  approximation  since
only one threshold  matters  to each government  at  any given time.  I run regressions
on changes in variables making the levels mostly irrelevant.  One potential  problem is
the slope coefficient "b,"  (figure  2) which measures the sensitivity  of the tax rate(s)
to changes in the revenue requirements  (G).  By pooling the data  with varying levels
18  "Under  pressure  to comply  with conditions  set by international  lenders,  Prime Minister  Sergei
Kiriyenko  of Russia today ordered  a 3 percent increase  on all import duties to raise revenues...
Raising  import duties was one of the demands  of the International Monetary  Fund and other
lenders  in order to start delivering  $17.1  billion  in new  loans  to Russia  (The  New  York  Times,  July
19, 1998)."
Similar  episodes  of the IMF  explicitly  or implicitly  recommending  the tariff rate increases  include
Argentina  (1997),  South  Africa (1993),  India (1990),  and Chile (1983).
'9See for example,  World Development  Report 1988,  Trade liberalization  in IMF-supported
programs  (1998),  Sewell  and Thirsk (1998)  and Mitra (1992).
17of G and tax bases, I am estimating the average slope and assuming implicitly  that
the slopes do not  change very much.  This is a limitation but  it seems to  be a
reasonable one given that it is not possible to assign which one of the hypothetical
curves each country is on at a given  time. Under this assumption, all countries share
the initial relationship between the tariff rate and the revenue requirement:
to = a + bGo  (8)
When there is an increase in G, the government can respond by simply increasing
the tariff rate and keeping  the tax base or expand the base (reform) and move to a
new relationship:
t  f  a + bGi  if no reform  (9)
a' + b'G1 if reform
The change in the tariff rate is given by the following  expression:
At = t-  to = b(Gi - Go) + {(a' - a) + (b' - b)Gi}(if reform=1)  (10)
Rewriting (10) in a form that can be estimated:
At =  30  +  3 1AG + 02ReformDummy  + /3 3G *  ReformDummy  (11)
where AG is the change in revenue requirements (fiscal shock), G is the current
government revenue requirement, and the ReformDummy indicates the episodes
of tax reforms.  31, 02, and  33 estimate "b," the sensitivity of the tax rates to
changes in fiscal needs,  "a'-a," the decrease in average fiscal burden due to  the
base expansion, and  "b'-b," the change in the sensitivities of the tax rate  when
G increases, respectively. ,1  is expected to be positive: tariff rates increase with
the revenue constraints in the  absence of a tax reform.  ,32 should be negative:
tax reforms reduce tariff rates, everything else constant.  In order to justify my
assumption that the slope coefficient  "b" does not change very much across different
revenue requirement levels,  ,3  should be roughly equal to zero.
If the macroeconomic  "bundling" argument is true, the sign of /3 will be neg-
ative for large shocks and zero otherwise. Only when there is a big shock, can the
government sneak in a trade reform. If the immediate response to shocks is to al-
ways tighten the trade restriction as Yatawara (1998) suggests, /13  will be positive
and the coefficient  on the reforms 32 would not be significant.
tabulation of results suggested by various theories
theory  PI  82  3
this paper  positive  negative  0
"bundling" argument  negative  negative  -
_(for  big shocks)  _
Yatawara (1998)  positive  0  0  -
I report the results of the estimation using the variables defined  as the following:
18AG:  % change in [Foreign Debt/GNP]*[LIBORI
(all in nominal)
Reform  Dummy:  as defined in section 4.1
G:  share  of government  expenditure  in GDP
I employ a proxy for a fiscal shock for the  change-in-requirement  variable  (AG)
instead  of the  actual  changes in the  expenditure.  I do so because  the  foreign debt
repayment  obligations  seem to be the  best  approximation  of the  fiscal requirement
in  the  real  world  of money-printing  and  arrears-accumulating  governments.  I use
the  share of government  expenditures  in GNP  for the revenue requirement  variable
(G) because  I believe they  reflect the  governments'  constraint  the best.20
I begin by running  a simple OLS regression.  All three  right  hand  side variables
are lagged because  these variables  are sampled at  the end of the  calendar  year while
the  dependent  variable  (change  in mean  tariff  rates)  is samnpled at  the  beginning
of the  fiscal  year.  Unfortunately,  the  samples  are  not  always  taken  in the  years
immediately  after  the  changes occurred.  This  is a  limitation  of the  data  set  but
hopefully not a fatal  one.  The results  support  the prediction  of the model:  the tariff
rate  increases when  there  is a  fiscal shock  (the  coefficient on the  shock variable  is
positive  and  significant),  and  the tariff rate  decreases when there  is an expansion  of
the  tax  base (the  coefficient on the  reform variable is negative and  significant).
Dependent  variable  =  %change in mean  tariff  rates
variables  OLS1  IV  OLS2  OLS3  OLS4
intercet  _  -0.016  -0.027  0.052  -0.015  0.049
intercept  (0.41)  (-0.46)  (0.85)  (-0.35)  (0.82)
0.435**  0.531*  0.551**  0.496**  0.579**
lag(shock)  (3.36)  (1.87)  (3.20)  (3.70)  (3.43)
lag(reform)  -0.271**  -0.538**  -0.244*  -0.223**  -0.193
(-2.58)  (-2.03)  (-1.71)  (-2.11)  (-1.36)
0.007  0.022  0.006  0.046  0.038
lag(gov't  exp*reform)  (1.59)  (1.63)  (0.92)  (1.04)  (0.57)
lag(seigniorage)  -0.604*  -0.446
(-1.97)  (-1.43)
A exchange rate  -0.047**  -0.039*
(-2.47)  (-1.90)
No of observations  75  49  57  73  57
adjusted  R2 0.187  0.241  0.252  0.278
F-score  0.000  0.008  0.001  0.000  0.001
t-statistics in parentheses
20I have used foreign  debt to GNP ratio multiplied  by LIBOR,  plain foreign  debt to GNP
ratio (without  multiplying  by LIBOR),  and actual collection  of tax revenues  in its place,  all with
qualitatively  similar  results.
19** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
There  is a potential  endogeneity  problem with the government  expenditure  vari-
able.  To the extent  that  the  shock variable is an imperfect proxy for the  exogenous
revenue requirement  changes the economies face, both  the error term and the govern-
ment expenditure  variable will pick up the effects of the omitted  true shock variable.
If this  problem  is prominent,  I expect  to underestimate  the coefficient on the  shock
variable.  There  is also a concern that  the tax  rates  and the expenditures  are jointly
determined.  The simultaneity  should not influence the estimates  of other  coefficients
as long as there is no collinearity problem among the independent  variables.  In order
to check for the  potential  problem,  I replace  the  government  expenditure  variable
with  instruments:  per  capita  real GDP, percent  of population  with at  least primary
education,  and  aid  to  central  government  expenditure  ratio  (first stage  results  re-
ported  in the  appendix).  The  result  using  the  instrumental  variable  technique  is
not very  different from  that  of the  OLS estimation.  The  coefficients still  have the
expected  signs and  are  significant  although  less strongly so.  Durbin-Wu-Hausman
tests  indicate  that  using  least  squares  will not  result  in serious  bias.  I  conclude
that  potential  problems  are not  severe and  report  the  OLS results  hereafter.
Next, I experiment  with adding  additional  explanatory  variables, seigniorage and
change in exchange rates,  to the  equation  in order to  improve the fit  of the  model.
Seigniorage is defined as the ratio  of the change in reserve money to total  revenue a
la  Cukierman  et al (1992). According to them,  the propensity  to print  money differs
across types  of governments.  Governments  that  tend  to  resort  to seigniorage  may
have different policies in adjusting  tariffs when faced with fiscal shocks.  Changes  in
exchange  rate  is another  type  of shock that  is likely to influence tariff policy. It  can
alleviate  any  endogeneity  problem  as well as add  further  explanatory  power to the
model.  Results  including  these  variables  are shown in columns  three  through  five.
The coefficients have the  expected  signs and  are significant when  only one of them
is added  to the equation.  They  also improve the  fit of the  model without  changing
the  results  qualitatively,  except  that  the  coefficient on  the  reform  variable  is not
significant  in  the  last  regression.  The  results  of the  estimations  seem  to  provide
some support  for the  hypothesis  I propose  although  they  are far from conclusive.
5  Conclusion
Tariffs and export  taxes  are important  sources of revenue for most developing coun-
tries.  In this paper,  I show why governments  may choose a tax regime characterized
by  a  narrow  base  and  high rates.  I also argue  that  trade  liberalization  should  be
observed  after  the  governments  diversify their  revenue  sources  through  efficiency-
enhancing  and  revenue-increasing  tax  reforms.  The  reforms are prompted  by rises
in revenue  requirements.  There  is some empirical evidence to support  this  hypothe-
20sis:  tariff rates  are positively related  to fiscal shocks and  negatively  associated  with
episodes  of tax  reforms.
An important  extension  of the  model would  be to  analyze  the  optimal  tax  de-
cisions in a dynamic  context.  In the paper,  many variables including  the  collection
costs  and  income are  predeterrnined  and  remain  constant.  In reality,  they  change
over time.  For  the  model  to  be truly  useful,  it  needs  to  be  able  to  answer  such
questions  as "should  the government  invest in the infrastructure  to improve the ad-
ministrative  capacity  of collecting taxes  now in order  to make  the  future  tax  base
expansions  less onerous  or wait  until  the  economy is a  little  richer?"  Endogeniz-
ing the  government  revenue  constraint  and  incorporating  quantity  barriers  into the
discussion  would also be interesting  tasks  for future  research.
216  Appendix
6.1  Proofs
Proposition  1: The tax  base 'y that  maximizes  V is nondecreasing  in G.
Proof:  I show for all G  and  feasible tax  rates  t(y; G) and  t(y +  1; G),  (1) V is
concave in G,  (2) -y =  1 maximizes  V  at  G  0  O, (3) V(t(-y +  1; G))  >  0 at  G =  G
s.t.  V(t(y;  G))  0, and  (4) V(t(-y; G)) and  V(t(-y + 1; G)) cross only once.
(1) V  is concave in G  (in the  range t(y; G) > 0 exists):
a9V  'y G  =  Ap(-ya)-(a-y)(-yo  -Z  Ci  - G)'1-1(-1)  < 0
i=1
Ap  AP(ya)-(acy)  (ay  - 1)(^a-  Ci - G)7 2 < 0
(2) As G  0,
ci










The difference between the  two tax  rates  is:
o!(E  Ci - 'YC+i)
lrn  t(y; G)-  rim  t(-y  + 1; G)  < 0
('ya - L  Cinb( + ')a  - E  Ci]
i=l  i=1
because  Cy < C,)+1 for all -y by construction.  Therefore,  as G  - 0,
t(l; G) < t(2; G) < ... < t(n; G)
Since V is decreasing  in t for a given -y, and  decreasing  in -y for a given t,
V(t(l;G))  > V(t(2;G)j  > ... > V(t(n;G))
22at  G arbitrarily  close to  0.
(3) Rewrite  the objective function  (6) by substituting  the expression  for t:
V =  Ap(ya)-(yae  - Ci - G)  (12)
Let  G be the level of G s.t.






V(t(y  + 1;  G)) = Ap[(y +  1)ce-4a+1)¶[(y  + 1)a - 5'  Ci -di(7+1)
i=l
=  Ap[(-y  + I)a]-(t+l')'(a  - C+1)(7+')-  > 0
where I have used the  assumption  a  > C+1.
(4) Let A be the log difference between  V(t(., y + 1)) and  V(t(.,  y)):
A  ln[V(t(-y + 1; G))] - ln[V(t('y; G))]
=-(y  + I)a  ln[(-y  + 1)a] + (1y  +  1)c ln[(-y  +  1)a-E  C-G]  (13)
i=l
±'ya  dn(-yaY)  - -ya ln(-yc  - C3 - G)
Differentiating  A with  respect to  G,
aA  -(-y +  1)a  -- yae  (14)
L-  Y+
1 - y4
(-y  + 1)a  C-  - C  G  -yce-E  C, - G
Evaluating  a9A  at  G = 0,
Aa(Z Ci - yC+i)
=[±iG=o  =C+  '  < 0  (15)
(+  1)a  - ci  [i][e - L  Ci]
i=  i=l
At  G close to 0, A  is negative  (from part(2))  and decreasing.  Let G be the level of
G s.t.  8=  0.
G = yCa  - ZCi
i23
23For all  G >  G
(x  C. - >Cy+  + G)
[(yl  +  )a - E  Ci - G][yo - EC,  - G]
The  intuition  for the  movement of A  is the  following.  Two countervailing  effects
affect  A  as -y changes.  First,  the  total  fiscal burden  (G +  E  Cj) is increasing  in
i=l~
'y:  A  decreases with  -y. The other  is the excess burden  of taxing  only a  subset  of
the  economy, which is decreasing  in -y: everything  else equal, it is better  to spread
out the  burden  of taxation  to  as many sectors  as possible.  When  G is very small,
the  first  effect dominates.  The marginal  loss of welfare is higher  for V(t(-y + 1; .))
than  for V(t(y;  .)) around  G = 0 because more is taken  out of the economy when an
additional  (-y  + lth)  sector is taxed.  At  G = G, the  two effects exactly  offset each
other.  The  second effect  (the  reduction  of excess burden)  dominates  for  G  >  G.
Therefore,  V(t(-y;.)) and  V(t(y  + 1;.))  cross only once in the  relevant range of G.
(1)-(4)  prove that  V(t(y;.))  intersects  V(t(y  + 1;.))  from above, and  does so only
once  in  the  relevant  range  of G.  When  G  is close to  0, the  smaller  the  -y, the
higher the welfare. The difference in welfare (A) decreases initially  (V(t(y;.))  stays
above V(t(-y + 1; .)))  but starts  to increase  at  G.  A  is increasing monotonically  in
G thereafter.  Therefore the optimal  tax base -y  is nondecreasing in G, which was to
be shown. A
Proposition2:  The optimal tax  rate decreases when the tax  base expands  (around
the  neighborhoods of the threshold  levels of G =  such that  V(t(-y; G)) = V(t(y  +
1;  G))).
Proof:  V(t(y; G)) = V(t(y  +  1;  G)) implies
1  + tY;)  1+  t(7 + 1; .)
Suppose t('Y;  G)  < t(-y + 1; G).  Then,  the  expression  in the  square  bracket  on  the
left  hand  side  is less than  1.  Since it is raised  to  the  power of a  positive  integer,
the  entire  left hand  side is a number that  is smaller than  1. On the other  hand, the
right  side is larger  than  1 by construction.  This  is a contradiction.  Therefore,  it
must be the case that  t('y; G) > t(-y  + 1; G). E
246.2  Definitions  and  sources  of  data
variable  source  definition
A  mean  tariff  rate  UNCTAD  (1994)  statutory  tarlff  ratet  - statutor
A  mean  tariff  rate  UNCTAD  (1994)  statutory  tariff  ratet-
World Development  %A  Foreig  Debt
shock  Indicator  (World Bank)  (al  inP  * LIBOR
Datastream  ~~(all  in nominal) D)at  astre am
Government  Fianance  %A in  tax  revenue  >cutoff
reform dummy  Statistics (various issues)  %A in  tOQtZvue  >cutoff
Santaella  (1996)  if IMF program  existed
Government  Penn  World Table(5.4)  government  expenditure
expenditure  gdp
seigniorage  International  Financial  reserve  moneyt  - reserve  moneyt 1
Statistics  (various issues)  total  revenuet
A exchange rate  International  Financial  exchange  ratet  - exchange  ratet-I
Statistics (various issues)  exchange  ratet_
%opopulation with
%pr  euationw  Barro-Lee  data  set
primary  education
Aid  World Development  Aid  (% of central
Government  Expenditure  Indicator  (World Bank)  government  expenditures)
256.3  Summary  Statistics
variable  N  Mean  Std.Dev  Minimum  Maximum
Mean  Tariff Rates
primary  products  119  27.690  18.509  3.700  90.800
manufactured  119  31.759  21.524  6.900  114.300
all  119  30.632  21.304  6.000  102.200
A Mean Tariff Rates
primary  products  77  -0.112  0.278  -0.776  1.000
manufactured  77  -0.119  0.251  -0.742  0.522
all  77  -0.119  0.247  -0.749  0.441
shock  651  0.127  0.381  -0.542  3.949
IMF program  666  0.213  0.410  0  1
per capita  real  GDP  626  2297.49  1707.91  422  8257
gov't  share in GDP  681  19.874  8.214  3.9  57.4
reform  (dummy)  76  0.539  0.502  0  1
Seigniorage  498  0.159  0.270  -0.090  3.978
A exchange rate  612  0.823  6.376  -0.283  139.311
A Terms of Trade  468  0.040  0.230  -0.626  1.888
% population  with  594  52.392  25.325  5.540  97.91
primary  education
% agriculture  output  484  25.970  14.129  4.848  62.250
in GDP
% aid in government  389  18.774  25.994  -0.252  180.246
expenditure
266.4  Countries  in regressions
country  actual  observation  year  fiscal year  starts  on
1982  1985  1988  1992
Algeria  85  89  92  January 1
Argentina  87  90  93  August  1
Bangladesh  83  86  88  93  July  1
Bolivia  86  January  1
Brazil  86  90  93  January  1
Burundi  80  86  88  January  1
Chile  87  88  92  January  1
Colombia  86  88  92  January  1
Cote  d'Ivoire  80  87  January  1
Ecuador  86  89  93  January  1
Egypt  81  86  89  July  1
Ghana  82  87  January  1
Haiti  82  87  Octoberl
India  81  87  90  92  April 1
Indonesia  80  87  90  92  April  1
Iran  80  87  March  21 or 22
Kenya  82  86  90  July 1
Korea  87  90  92  January  1
Madagascar  86  88  January  1
Malawi  85  88  April 1
Malaysia  81  87  88  92  January  1
Mexico  83  87  90  92  January  1
Morocco  82  87  93  January  1
Nepal  83  87  93  July  15
Nigeria  82  87  90  93  April 1
Pakistan  82  84  88  92  July  1
Paraguay  80  84  92  January  1
Sierra Leone  82  86  July  1
Sri Lanka  83  87  90  93  January  1
Sudan  80  86  July  1
Syria  82  85  January  1
Tanzania  82  86  88  July  1
Thailand  81  85  89  91  October  1
Tunisia  82  87  88  92  January  1
Turkey  87  88  93  January  I
Venezuela  87  89  92  January  1
Zaire  81  86  89  January  1
Zimbabwe  83  86  89  Jan  1 (-84),  Jul  1
276.5  First  stage  regressions
Dependant  Variable
variables  lag (reform*gov't  exp)  lag  (gov't exp)
intercept  7236;*  30.079**
1.649  2.451
lag (shock)  (0.30)  (0.26)
18.851**  -0.629
lag  (reformn)  (10.88)  (-0.33)
per capita  real  GDP  0.01*  -0.oO1*
per  capita  real GDP  (-1.95)  (-1.66)
% population  -0.072**  -0.140**
with primary  education  (-2.08)  (-3.64)
aid/government  0.064  0.114**
expenditure  ratio  (1.52)  (2.46)
No. of observations  49  49
Adjusted  R2 0.76  0.55
t-statistics in parentheses
**  significant at 5% level
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Figure  1: Optimal  relationship  of Revenue requirement  (G),  tariff rate  (t), and  tax
base  (gamma)
32t
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Figure  2: Log linearized relationship  between Revenue requirement  (G) and tax rate
(t)
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